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Synthesising co-management for Lake Victoria: discussions on models relating
to concepts of sustainability and participative management
SEDA WOG (the Socio-economie Data Working Group of the LVFRP)'
Introduction
A workshop aimed at developing analysis of the results of the co-management survey was held in Jinja,
Uganda from the 29th November to 3 December 1999. The approach used was to provide a series of
theoretical models that might be used as a basis for developing results analysis and the conceptual
framework of research papers. The models used were as follows:
The 'Drummond and Symes' model (Drummond and Symes, 1997) that shows the classic depletion
of a resource base and addresses the question of how 'unsustainable tendencies' might be addressed;
The 'Lélé' model (Lélé, 1991) which styles itself as a "more realistic interpretation of sustainable
development" of natural resources;
(e) The 'Indiana' model (WPTPA, 1997) which shows, at the interpersonal level, how relationships are
built or destroyed and the effects of this on institutions;
(d) The Sen and Nielsen (1996) model that seeks to locate fisheries management systems on a scale of
operation between extremes of community and government control.
In each instance the model was presented, then the participants vere asked to develop a series of exercises
culminating in an exposition of the relevance of the model to their own country situations and the processes
of fisheries pianti i ng, development and management.
Regulation and unsustainable outcomes (Drummond and Symes, 1997)
Introduction
The model (Figure 1) is based on the capitalist mode of resource exploitation and benefit production and
therefore assumes that the benefits stream is not only sustainable over time, but can grow. Interventions
may prevent a particular event occurring at a particular time and in a particular place but the (unsustainable)
tendency remains and ¡s likely to be expressed elsewhere. Controlling fishing effort in one place is likely to
redirect effort, for example, to other species, other locations and/or other times i.e. through measures which
tend to involve other forms of unsustainability. Drummond and Symes postulate that an alternative
approach would be to address the 'unsustainable tendency' involved rather than the outcomes produced.
Thus, it is necessary to explore the relationships between the outcomes and the often unobservable, but
nevertheless influential, structures and mechanisms that underpin these events.
In Figure 1, intervention I may represent intervention by the regulatory authorities to curb fishing pressure,
by, for example, banning of a type of fishing gear. The immediate effect can result iii a temporary
alleviation of pressure on the fish stock, but this advantage is quickly lost, for the root cause of excessive
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fishing effort has not been tackled. Fishing pressure rebuilds towards outcome 'a'. Similar events, '2' and
'3', give rise to 'b' and 'e'. The overall trend towards non-viability of the particular capital and social
formation is only briefly interrupted. Overall, the sum of these materially unsustainable outcomes further
degrades the resource base over time.
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The discussion was then developed with respect to the fisheries of Lake Victoria, and two questions were
posed:
What are the unsustainable tendencies that characterise the fisheries sectors based ou the lake's
resources?
Would it be possible to transform or remove the 'influential structures and inechanisms' that are
driving unsustainability in the Nile Perch fishery?
Response from the L'ancIan particoants
In addressing the first question, "what is the nature of the unsustainable tendencies that characterise the
fisheries production sector based on Lake Victoria's resources?", the respondents chose to put forward a
number of indicators that support the hypothesis that fish biomass arid population structure have been
adversely altered and that this shows evidence of unsustainable tendencies. The indicators were as follows:
Fishermen believe that there is less fish now than five years ago;
In order to catch enough fish it is necessary to spend more time fishing;
The species diversity in the lake has been reduced;
There are moie boats fishing than five years ago;
The average size of fish landed is smaller than five years ago;
(f Illegal fishing techniques are still in use;
(g) Fishing pays less now than it did five years ago.
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Furthermore, the respondents commented that in ternis of transforming or removing the 'influential
structures and inechanisms' that are driving unstistainability ¡n Uganda's fisheries, there were a number of
key factors. Possibly of most importance of these were the property rights of the lake's fisheries, in which
access to the resource base was viewed as 'God given', Whilst there maybe local interventions that seek to
either regulate access and/or exert 'ownership' claims, these are, for the most part, subordinated by a general
(implicit) policy of unregulated access to what are common property fisheries resources. The lack of
defined ownership and access regulations may well be of importance in the development of 'lawless'
behaviour in the fishery. Thus, it appears that fishermen are either unaware or deliberately flout regulations
that are intended to control illegal fishing techniques and conserve fish biomass. There are also very
practical reasons why fishermen take this course of action. For example, there is intense pressure to catch
fish for local consumption by, or 'export' from, the lake dwelling communities. This can be facilitated by
recourse to the use of small-meshed gears that will target undersized fish. These gears are not only widely
available to fishermen, but are also cheaper than the recommended gears. Despite the knowledge that these
gears exist, and are ín use, the Fisheries Department has not made headway in controlling neither illegal
usage nor the gear supply outlets. In some instances, the lack of success of the Fisheries Department ma» be
affected by the existence of deeply entrenched and widespread corruption that is institutionalised in
Uganda's fishing industry.
The behaviour of the lake's fishermen is also influenced by some very powerful external factors. The
distant markets for fish from the lake, whilst fluctuating in intensity or location, are buoyant and exert a
steady pressure on fishermen and processors alike to seek to meet consumer demand. Inevitably, this
demand falls unchecked upon the resource base. There is little incentive for user groups to moderate effort
in the short term to try to secure long-term security. Furthermore, unsustainable tendencies will be
reinforced by apparently remote external changes, such as fluctuations in forex values.
The market apart, there are other external factors impacting upon the viability of the lake fisheries.
Increased anthropogenic activity in the lake catchment has brought with it greater demands for water use,
deterioration of water quality in some locations and a build up of toxins in some fish species.
Giveii this spectrum of constraints and institutionalised unsustainable tendencies, the route to improve the
situationcan only ever be complicated, resource intensive and will need to be implemented over a long time
horizon. This would mean tackling the problems on several major fronts. There is the need to:
Educate and sensitise user groups to the status of the lake's resources;
Intervene at the highest political levels to examine policy options that might co-ordinate the
transformation of the lake's fisheries, mindful of the widespread existence of corruption;
(e) Examine the realities of reshaping the property rights and access regimes of the lake, but in the wider
context of agricultural and infrastructural development and demographic change;
Mobilise resources that will ensure the validity, acceptance and compliance with the fisheries
regulations, and in so doing, sow the seeds for tackling excessive fishing effort;
Seek solutions to incipient problems posed by water hyacinth, deteriorating water quality conditions
and the ingress of polluting discharges.
Response from the Kenyan particoants
What is the nature of the unsustainable tendencies that characterise the fisheries production sector based on
Lake Victoria's resources? Would it be possible to transform or remove the 'influential structures and
mechanisms' that are driving unsustainability in the fishery? (in italics following tendency)
1. Lake environmental factors
Introduction of nets in lake to replace traditional methods: cannot be controlled.
Conventional fishing: introduction of mechanised transport (e.g. outboard engines), enabling
expansion of area fished: cannot be controlled.
(e) Introduction of trawlers in the lake: can be controlled. 76
Introduction of Nile perch, causing decline of species diversity: difficult to control
Introduction of water hyacinth: can be controlled with use of chemica], mechanical and manual
methods ofremo val.
Pollution as a result of release of domestic and sewage and industrial waste, increased settlement and
agricultural activity: can be controlled.
Destruction of wetlands and other fish habitats: can be controlled through creation ofawareness,
educating local communities and reha bilitation.
River development projects interfering with fish breeding patterns and the environment: difficult to
control because the process is natural.
2. Technical fish production factors
Fish poisoning: can be controlled through bans and awareness cathpaigns.
Beach seining: technically not illegal; widespread use in most communities difficult to control
because oflatter reasons.
'Tembea' fishery: cannot be controlled
Trawling: can be controlled.
Illegal mesh-size gill-netting: difficult to control andmonitor.
Mosquito seining using less than 10 mm. mesh-size: difficult to control because mesh-sies ofabove
10mm una vailable in shops.
Increasing total length of fishing gears e.g. long-lines, gill-nets etc.: very difficult to control.
Use of attraction lamps in mosquito seining operations: very hard to control because no other way to
catch 'dagaa
Use of 'seke seke': can be controlled by educating the people.
Fishing river mouths: can be controlled.
Fishing in breeding areas: can be controlled, but breeding areas are not marked, so difficult.
(I) Fishing ofjuvenile fish: controlled by use oflegal gear.
3. Market factors
Change in nature of fish trade from subsistence to filly commercial: difficult to change.
Establishment of factories: increasing numbers of fish processing and fish meal plants: expansion can
be controlled and quotas enforced.
Increased exports of fish: cannot be controlled
Increased demand for fish: cannot be controlled.
Improved infrastructure, e.g. roads and cold storage: cannot be controlled because this comprises the
development oflanding beaches.
Extensions of fish marketing channels, including the buying of fish on the lake: difficult to control.
Markets for juvenile fish: can be controlled through campai;gns to discourage it.
Improved fish prices: cannot be controlled
Artisanal fish processing expanding the scope of markets: cannot be controlled.
4. Socio-cultural and political factors
Population increase: can be controlled through awareness, family planning campalgns.
Migration: very difficult to control
Unemployment: very difficult to control although can be done.
Poverty: very difficult to control due to complexities involved.
Child labour: possible to control through education and awareness campaigns.
Increased investment: difficult to control
Decreased farming activities around the lake: difficult to control
Increased demand for food leading to unsustainability f fishery: difficult to control
Changes in family structures: difficult to control
77
Response from the Taaniznpathcoants
The respondents felt that the unsustainable tendencies that characterised the fisheries production sector
based on Lake Victoria' s fisheries were determined by interaction of and between the following general
groups of factors:
Management
The use of research findings are not fully integrated into the management of the fishery.
Extension services are ineffective because extension officers also have law enforcement
responsibilities, which account for most of their time.
(e) Fishing is regarded as a 'poor man's' activity and hence there is little effort on the part of politicians
to support the fisheries sector.
Regulations have been formulated in a 'top-down' fashion, and hence they have little support around
the lake. These problems are compounded by lack of awareness of the regulations of the fishing
communities.
Revising regulations and laws concerning the fisheries takes too long.
Conflict arisingfrom competing interests
Fish processing industries have profit maximisation objectives and very high demands for fish, which
conflict with the regulatory and sustainability objectives of fisheries managers.
Local communities and councils seek to levy taxes on any income generating activity, irrespective of
whether or not; for example, such income is generated by illegal gear. This conflicts with the jaw
enforcement objectives of the FD.
Target communities are not typically involved in the planning of prqjects, which are supposed to
benefit them.
Inadequate or flawed communications
Research and data derived from fishing communities does not typically return to them, instead being
disseminated through journals and other media to which such communities have no access.
Inadequate data and use of information
information on fish stocks and fishing communities either do not exist or are inadequate, compounding
attempts to design sustainable management strategies.
Lack of resources
There are inadequate personnel in the management and research of the fishery, and insufficient resourcing.
In response to the question of whether it would be possible to transform or remove the 'influential structures
and mechanisms' that are driving unsustainability in the fishery, the participants commented that there was a
need for harmonisation of planning between TAFIRI and the Fisheries Departments. Furthermore, they said
that the combining of extension and law enforcement functions is flawed and leads to problems of identity
in the field. There is a lack of understanding and co-operation between the District and Municipal Councils
and the FD. Better 'nesting' of these agencies must be developed. This could be an issue for local
polìticians to take on, as they would hopefully appreciate the value of involving local people in policy
planning and formulation at all levels.
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A more realistic interpretation of sustainable development (Lélé, 1991)
Introduction
Figure 2 shows, in the author's words,. "a more realistic representation of the poverty-environmental
degradation problem" (Lélé, 1991: 614). Whilst the figure is interesting in its linkage of a variety of sources
of variables, what does it mean and how could it possibly relate to the Lake Victorian situation? Clearly, it
is an attempt to relate the utilisation of a natural resource (or resources) to the environment and community.
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Figure 2: A more realistic modelling of sustainable development (Lélé, 1991).
Essentially it is a 'feedback' model where access to resources (and therefore exploitation) has consequences
for poverty, affluence and environmental degradation. The main flow appears to be north/south where
affluence, primed by technology, moves via over-consumption to poverty. But that is not the only flow as
(restricted) access to resources appears to create poverty by a short cut, whereas (open) access to resources
starts off with affluence until the phenomenon of over-consumption is entrained. The culture/value and
technology actors have 'bit' parts in this play, although the suggestion is that they have the potential to
reinforce the slide from affluence to environmental degradation. Affluence must have connotations of (links
with) the market, but this is not represented per se. There is a circular of flow between the boxes of poverty
and environmental degradation.
Affluence will be short lived, as the prosperity of one set of users attracts others to the fishery. They make
investments in an effort to derive similar benefits from the fishery. An effort build up ensues and
precipitates a slide from relative affluence towards poverty via degradation of the resource base
The Lélé model cannot readily be equilibrated, as the forces involved tend to short-circuit with a tendency to
be poverty driven by some, or all, of the main boxed functions of the model. This is so because the model
argues against the concept of sustainable development. Whilst equilibrium cannot be reached per se from
the model as it stands, there is scope for interventions that may be able to drive the model in directions other
then towards the poverty sink. It may be possible to initiate flow in a circuit between affluence, culture
(values) and technology by adopting an exploitation system that is not dominated by the production
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TECHNOLOGY
determinant, but is moderated instead by culture and values to extract modest quantities of the resource to
satisfy local needs. The system will, of course, be influenced by the activities of adjacent user groups who
are active in the system. Indeed, it may be necessary to isolate one group's activities from another in an
effort to guarantee the integrity of the different exploitation ethos. In practice this would probably require
spatial separation, and there is evidence from othr fisheries that this is workable subject to the
accommodation of threats posed by the environment.
There are two key cycles within the model that might be valid in the context of fisheries exploitation
systems: the poverty sink from 'affluence' to poverty via environmental degradation and the cycle of
linkages from affluence, culture (values) and technology.
The course participants were then asked to comment in detail on the following:
To what extent is the Lélé model able to facilitate our understanding of what has happened to
fisheries on the lake?
In retrospect, can you use the model to describe/analyse the recent crisis of the Nile perch fishery?
Are there points on the model where policy interventions might be made in an attempt to change the
direction of flow?
What are the limitations of the model in terms of its application to Lake Victoria's fisheries and
where might its structure be improved to better explain what is actually happening?
Would you want to modify the model in any way?
Would it be possible to simulate the effect on the model of an effective co-management regime?
Response IIvrn the Uganda particijoants
The respondents argued that 'affluence', at least amongst fishermen, was a short-lived phenomenon. This
was because when affluence was gained (as a result of prosperity associated with exploitation of the
resource) it served only to attract other participants to the fishery, thereby reducing the rent per individual
operator. Thus when the numbers of entrants to the fishery built up above a certain level, catch (and
eventually stock levels) would fall, thereby reducing the benefits stream. The flow from affluence to
poverty via resource degradation would be entrained.
The model facilitates understanding of what has happened to the fisheries on Lake Victoria in the following
ways:
There are too many boats, fishers and quantities of fishing gear on the lake and this has caused
environmental degradation.
Despite attempts by the FDs to limit effort, the resource behaves as if it is in the state of "open-
access".
'Wrong' technology, such as the use of illegal fishing gear, has lead to the degradation of the
resource.
In terms of the impact of cultural values, the tribes that have always eaten tilapia dominate the sector
and in the case of Uganda this has given rise to environmental degradation.
Unchecked introduction of improved technology has led to environmental degradation. The
improved transport commensurate with possession of the engines has enabled fishers to migrate to
new locations expanding pressure on the resource base.
The respondents felt that, using the Ugandan fisheries situation as an example, there were points in the
model where policy interventions might be made in an attempt to change the direction of flow:
Through the creation of boundaries and restricted access of users.
Through the provision of services, creation of alternative employment and infrastructure.
(e) Through encouraging fishers to fish for other species besides the tilapia.
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Those ethnic groups who have been historically associated with the fishery should be advised on
alternative employment opportunities.
The govermnent should establish taxation laws, which are better linked to peoples' incomes.
In terms of its application to Lake Victoria's fisheries the model is limited in that it fails to consider: lack of
alternative employment; taxation problems; market trends; investment trends. The affluence 'box' should
be split to include markets and investment (e.g. fish processing factories). Suggested improvements in the
tailoring of the model to the Ugandan fisheries situation are shown in Figures 3 and 4.
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Figure 3: Indications of weaknesses in Lélé's model from a Ugandan perspective (Odongkara/Atai/
Gonga/Nyapendi)
In terms of the model, a successfully deployed co-management regime would be expected to:
Establish boundaries and restrict access;
Address 'wrong technology';
Strengthen regulations between stakeholders;
Influence the affluence 'box' by establishing quotas for fish processors and commercial fishers and
address the problems associated with short-term decision-making strategies.
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Figure 4: Ugandan policy intervention suggestions (OdongkaralNyapendilGonga/Atai)
Response from the Kenyan particijoants
The respondents raised a number of examples of adverse practices associated with the lake fisheries that
might be associated with 'culture' and 'values'. These were as follows:
Fish poisoning: the use of poisons in the lake fishery was believed to have emanated from a lakeside people
influenced by a culture of greed and low moral values. This was a good example of 'wrong' technology and
caused the indiscriminate death of large numbers of fish, particularly tilapines. Furthermore, water quality
was adversely affected, and thus leading to environmental degradation. The consequence of fish poisoning
was a ban on fish exports from the lake and the refusal of local consumers to buy fish. These outcomes
reinforced the problem of poverty amongst the lakeside dwelling peoples through reduced incomes, reduced
employment and reduced food for home consumption. The government could have a role here in reversing
such declines (see Figure 5) by changing peoples' culture and values through education, promotion,
enforcing the law and more zealously seeking out and punishing offenders.
Theft of gear: the lake-wide problem of theft of fishing gear was viewed as a cultural problem. Because
passive gears (e.g. gill nets) are more susceptible to theft, in an effort to counter this fishers have employed
active gears. Thus beach seines are widely in use. Unfortunately, the mesh size used in the cod-end of a
beach seine is small and thus the catch of undersized fish is high. This, in turn, fuels the problems of
poverty and environmental degradation. This trend will not be countered simply by banning gears. It will
require a bottom-up approach with support and initiatives from the communities. Government intervention
might occur through more carefully crafted taxation policies and the provision of credit facilities (see Figure
6).
82
Education and
n
Q .-
AFFLUENCE
Too many
sensitisation CULTURE AND
>'-
cQ
n-
n
fishers/boats VALUES
C
C
Q
n
TECHNOLOGY
ACCESS TO
RESOURCES
Q
oc.
CQ
QQCQ
POVERTY
GOVERNMENT
INTERVENTION
NGOs
CBOs
TECHNOLOGY
Fi ure 5: Ken an su' estions for overnment intervention in poverty alleviation (Abila!Lwenyal
Omwenga/Omwega).
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Figure 6: Kenyan suggestions for government intervention in fish markets (AbilalLwenyalOmwenga/
Omwega).
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Over capacity: disproportionate access (due to accumulated capital) leads to affluence in the fish-processing
sector. This leads to more capital accumulation and over-consumption and over-fishing. Eventually,
environmental degradation causes poverty through resource loss. The government should intervene through
limiting access to the sector, such as through the imposition of quotas.
Market interventions: This could take the form of limiting the amount of fish bought by imposing quota
allocations on imports, or preventing the establishment of additional fish processing factories (see Figure 7).
Appropriate interventions might also include establishing property rights and effort controls.
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Figure 7: Kenyan suggestions for government intervention in 'wrong' technology control (AbilalLwenyal
Omwenga/Omwega).
Limitations of the model: the model does not relate to those problems within the fishery that are the result of
environmental degradation, e.g., quality control problems. Furthermore, it does not recognise certain
linkages, for example, between poverty and choice of technology.
Effect of the model on an effective co-management regime: must establish boundaries; address 'wrong'
technology; set quotas for exports; 'correct' decisions made by fishers in relation to the use of 'wrong' gear.
Response from the Thnzanian particijoants
The use of these illegal-fishing techniques can be understood from the Lélé model, because they result in the
degradation of the lake's ecosystem. The lake is open-access and because of this, poor fishers, who can only
afford cheap (and bad) fishing gear, can easily enter into the fishery. Owing to the desire to make quick
returns, particularly in the tilapia fishery, some fishers have turned to using poison to catch fish. This
practice has been influenced by the high demand for tilapia, and hence contributed to the decline of the
lake's ecosystem. Cultural traits that favour the capture of certain species can also affect the lake's
ecosystem. The high demand for Labeo species amongst the Luo and other Tanzanian ethnic groups
encourages fishing in river mouths and fish breeding areas.
The existence of highly commercial species (Nile perch, tilapia and 'dagaa') has resulted in over-investment
in the fishery and the development of inappropriate technologies, such as the 'tembea' method, which
contribute to environmental degradation. The presence of these species has resulted in an unequal
distribution of wealth. This may also contribute to the degradation of the lake's ecosystem. At the same
time, fishers have resorted to using illegal gear types (an example of poor short-terni decision-making),
thereby contributing to this process. The poor education base amongst fishers has reinforced the tendency to
adopt 'wrong' technology and lias subsequently contributed to degradation of the lake ecosystem.
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The group felt that interventions were necessary and feasible in the model. Figures 8 and 9 show reviewed
linkages on: culture and values; education and awareness; poverty alleviation programmes and policies;
regulations (such as controlling the number of boats, fishers, gear and processing factories); access to
resources; controls and regulations and property rights.
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Figure 8: A Tanzanian response to the Lélé model (Medard/Onyango)
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Figure 9: Tanzanian suggestions for changes to the Lélé model (Onyango/Medard)
The participants felt that the Lélé model was limited in that:
The model only describes trends that result in environmental degradation but does not suggest any
solutions.
The model does not clearly demonstrate the role of government.
The model is very pessimistic.
The model does not consider external trends (such as international fluctuations in the Nile perch
market).
The model can only be applied to Lake Victoria's commercial species and not to other, indigenous,
varieties.
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Relationships between individuals in user groups (WPTA, 1997)
Introduction
Figure 10 seeks to lay out the co-ordinatds that govern the reactions of individuals with respect to day to day
living including institutional arrangements governing the exploitation of natural resources. The model
indicates what may occur in many (or, possible, all) social contexts, but could conveniently be used to
explain, for example, why groups (or individuals) keep or break institutional rules, and how conflicts are
resolved. The figure has a central core of three strategic assets that describe the ingredients for an effective,
working relationship between individuals and/or groups. This triangle of factors is predicted on a series of
enabling criteria based on: group size (small is beautiful?); modes of communication (face to face
preferred); holding of shared (cultural?) norms; congruency of interests and resources; and 'track rec;d'
over time.
Small gro up
Face-to-face
communication
L
Figure 10: The Workshop on Political Theory and Policy Analysis (1997) model.
There is then an offshoot that translates the triangle of strategic assets into action, resulting in the generation
of (greater) net benefits because of a low-cost production function (internalising the externalities) e.g.
internalising monitoring, control and surveillance (MCS) costs; reducing and maintaining institutions to
conserve natural resources; and developing intergenerational equity.
The workshop participants were asked to then consider the following questions in relation to the Indi"na
model and its applicability to the Lake Victoria situation:
Could the figure relate to community/group behaviour in the Lake Victoria situation? How universal
would its application be in this context?
Could a tangible example of this model be developed with reference to a community situation (and
the exploitation/management of the lake's fisheries)? Identify key players in a specific location.
To what extent do you feel the following factors are important to communication and decision-
making in the communities of Lake Victoria basin?
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(d) Would you modify the model to suit what you know of the institutions in the lakeside communities?
Response from the Ugandan particoants
The respondents commented that the model could relate to community group behaviour in the Lake Victoria
situation. The beach communities consist of small groups; their communication is face to face; they have
shared norms that relate to fishing practices. In these situations costs are often incurred when trying to reach
a common position on various issues, and (cash) contributions may be made in tills respect. Community
members wìll make use of information about the past to build trust and reputations. Together with
reciprocity, the three strategic assets of the model are applicable to beach communities. These assets lead to
co-operation on landings, which can include setting out together to fishing grounds, co-operating in
marketing and setting fish prices, and solving internal problems. Benefits will arise from this co-operation.
The model is possibly limited by corruption.
In terms of tangible examples derived from the model, it is worth considering Nkombwe Landing, Mukono
District. This is a small beach of around 200 inhabitants. The beach has a number of institutions, amongst
which are LCs, the Task Force, beach committee, a women's group, FD personnel and members of the
community itself. Meetings are convened with the beating of a drum, summoning community rnernbrs.
Communication is face to face. The landing has a history of developing trust and reputations within the
groups, The groups share common interests in the fishery, and co-operate to adhere to the regulations put in
place by the Task Force. These include restricted night fishing, market prices, compliance with fishing
regulations, having correct certification and identification of all fishers. Benefits include the elimination of
illegal operations (e.g. fish poisoning), expectations of lugher catches, bigger fish landed and high prices in
the ftmture.
In terms of Ugandan fishing community examples group size is important as the smaller the group, the more
effective are communication, discussion and decision-making. In terms of mode of communication, face to
face communication is effective, uses little time, and responses are immediate. Because it is verbal,
however, it may be easy to forget and can be distorted or misinterpreted. The holding of shared norms
makes it easier to communicate and understand one another and to reach decisions, Congruency of interests
and shared resources generate a need to commrmnicate and to generate common decisions. Possessing an
established track record over time enables group members to communicate and make decìsions.
The effectiveness of the model could be compromised by: conflicts of interest amongst individuals/groups;
competitìonlbribery; migration of fishers; growth in the size of beaches; the impact of external factors such
as the market and change in the cuvironmental.
Response from the Kenyan partieoants
In Kenya, the fishers of beach communities communicate face to face through beach meetings. At these
meetings the cost of arriving at an agreement may be minimised because all members recognise the
authority of the meetings. In terms of shared norms: one is not allowed to use someone's boat without
permission. Information about past actions is transmitted through the beach meetings. This generally
consolidates reputation and the beach leaders are trusted. There is a high degree of reciprocity in action at
the beach meetings.
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The Wichium fishing community is an example of a beach community that fits the Indiana model. Here the
beach committee operates through face to face communication. One of the interesting outcomes of the co-
operation at Wichlum has been the co-operative financing of beach patrols.
Response from the Tanzanian particijvants
The participants concentrated on an example of a women's fishing group from Ruhanga village that has a
membership of 15-20 women. Its objectives are to increase their members' incomes through fishing
activities; to reduce dependency on men for ali their needs; and to promote gender equity. All of the
members ofthe group live in one village, and hence there is always face to face communication. The group
has a constitution, which guides them in the event of any disputes. Membership is restricted to married
women from Ruhanga Village alone. In order to minimise the incidence of g : et, as well as to develop
employment opportunities the crew for the boats are drawn from the wc:: : ies. The group has
elected office bearers, such as a chairperson, secretary and treasurer, each own, clearly defmed,
responsibilities. They also have an older woman who advises them. The gro.: ; :voives itself in various
activities, responsibility for which revolves amongst its members, which gives an indication of the level of
internal trust and reciprocity. The group has operated since the early i 990s. The founding members met
each other and developed the idea of the group while cooking during we'Hg r:: funeral ceremonies. The
group has its own bank account, a fishing boat, an outboard engine and a iu:::.er of gill nets. The group has
sought to reduce its workload by establishing a nursery school to look : inernòecs' children. The service
is free to its members, although they all contribute towards food fo ie ciiildren ancTi salaries of staff. The
nurseiy is located in the home of one of the members. The group assists in the training of other women in
neighbourhood villages so that they can learn about the best ways in which to set up similar groups. The
group's secretary is guardian to another village group. Conflicts and problems are solved by strict
adherence to the Group Constitution. The older woman who advises the group will also, in the event of a
dispute, arbitrate and mediate. She is much respected and has been an impartial acc' trustworthy mediator.
Besides employing only family members for their fishing crew, the group has additional measures designed
to prevent theft. Fish is sold according to schedules and is closely supervised. When fish prices are low at
their beach, they will seek out buyers at other beaches in an effort to obtain the best possible prices. The
group collaborates with the District Community Development Officer and Regional and District Fisheries
Officers in an effort to solicit additional funding, and were able to secure monies for the purchase of the
outboard engine. In 1995, with the support of another neighbourhood group, the Ruhanga Women Fishing
Group formed and umbrella organisation, based in a neighbouring village. The objectives of the
organisation are to gain equal income opportunities for its members, initiate small projects, develop ideas
and to facilitate to achievement of common objectives that involve higher costs that the women's group are
unable to cover.
In terms of decision-making the group has three leaders, a chairperson, a secretary and a treasurer. The
committee comprises five people, and reviews the group's activities and makes decisions on more
immediate concerns. The Committee meets on a monthly basis. A generai 9ssenbly is held biannually, to
discuss more important issues and to present finance, membership status, fa: sing :riobiiisation and strategic
reports. It is possible for them to meet more frequently because all live in the same village.
To maintain contact externally, the group uses public transport and bicycles to reach the nearby town of
Bukoba. Boats are used to get to other beaches and the islands. One of the umbrella group members has a
telephone, which the group may use. The group uses Kiswahili in its deliberations, and all members are
comfortable with this language. Their records are all kept in files.
In terms of the benefits generated, the group's structure and activities has impressed donors, government
leaders and the public. The group managed to obtain funding from a consortium of donors. The group has
managed to establish a nursery school in their village. The group has managed to set up other income
generating activities, such as water transport and hiring out boats. From the above case study, the Indiana
model can be seen to be applicable in the ways given in Fig. Il.
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The co-rfangement relationship: institutional and org
Introduction
Figure 12 shows a series of integrating points between two management extremes, where either government
or user groups dominate. Figure 13 (Symes, 1995) indicates three hypothetical options for the distribution
of planning, development and management responsibilities between the centre and community.
LONG TERM
HORIZON
REPUTATION
COMMON INTERESTS
SMALL GROUPS
INFORMATION ON
PAST RECORDS
DEVELOPMENT OF
SHARED NORMS
TRUST
LEVEL OF
COOPERATION
JL
NET BENEFITS
JIL
FORMATION OF
OTHER SMALL
GROUPS
sational options (Sen and Nielsen, 1996)
RECIPROCITY
Figure 11: Tanzanian suggestions for institutional robustness (Medard/Onyango)
Working from the government extreme, the role of the user groups in management would be minimal and
they would work to an agenda as instructed by government, which is the dominant partner. The next point
('consultative'), refers to greater involvement of the user groups in the management process. The lead role,
however, is still taken by government. Working from the other extreme, user groups would shoulder the
burden of management and government would only be informed of activities in the management process.
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FACE TO FACE LOW COST OF A VING
COMMUNICATION AT AGREEMENT
The next point ('advisory'), sees a stronger role for government but only in the capacity to provide
management advice. The median point of co-operation assumes an equivalent power sharing between
government and the user groups. It assumes the existence of organisations jointly run by government and
user groups. There are many other points on the scale that might be used to describe other co-management
relationships that are in existence.
USER GROUP
MANAGEMENT
Instructive
GOVEPJÏMENT
MANAGEMENT
Figure 12: A framework for developing a co-management model (Sen and Nielsen, 1996).
The participants were then asked to consider the following statements:
Where do you feel the current management emphasis lies in the context of Lake Victoria's fisheries?
What criteria would you use to define the cUrrent situations in the riparian states?
(e) Are there a number of models in existence? To what extent do they differ between countries?
(d) Assuming it is possible to move between different points on the scale and if so, in which direction would we
want the management partnership for Lake Victoria's fisheries to move? Flow might this movement be
achieved?
Response from the Kenyan particijoants
The participants responded that the current management emphasis in the fishery lay with government. In
this case, Fisheries Officers (FOs) hand out the rules and it is the job of the communities to obey these. This
is an instructive, 'top-down' management system.
In terms of the criteria used to define the current situations in the riparian states, this should be to deride
whether or not to use group-based or government-based management. The only model in Kenya is the
instructive model. When it comes to such issues as the control of poisoning and gear theft, however,
government contro! diminishes. The participants believed that there should be a management system in
which government and communities both have a role to play in a co-operative arrangement.
GOVERNMENT BASED MANAGEMENT
Consultative
Cooperative
Advisory
USER GROUP BASED MANAGEMENT
Informativ
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This arrangement should be born out of the recognition that there are some roles that communities cannot
perform and others that government has difficulty discharging.
M = Management
P = Planning
D = Development
RBs = Regulatory bodies
RUGs Resource User Groups
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Centrally imposed Intgrated management Devolved management
management
Figure 13: Variants on the conceptual model (Symes, 1995)
Response from the Tanzanian particijoants
The participants believe that in the context of the fisheries of Lake Victoria, the current management
emphasis is tied in with the species of fish exploited. It is dominated therefore by reference to the Nile
perch fishery and its availability.
The participants felt that, assuming it is possible to move between different points on the scale, the
management partnership for Lake Victoria's fisheries should be one in which each stakeholder has a clearly
defined role - that each should discharge its duties without dominating other stakeholders. The user groups
should comprise the following: fishers, fish traders, fish processors and anybody who benefits from the
lake's resources.
Government intervention should assume the following forms:
Awareness creation: fishers should be made aware of their managerial roles and should be
empowered to assume managerial responsibilities. They should be made aware of how to initiate
management actions.
Education: training should be offered to fishers in net-making, fish processing, marketing, book
keeping, regulations and quality control.
Study tours: fishers should visit the best fishing communities (beaches to be studied).
Response from the U
In the Ugandan case, current managemetat lies in the consultive segment where government and user
groups re greatly involved in the management process, although te government is still the dominant pai titer
(see Figure 14).
Roles presently
defmed
COMMISSIONER OF
FISHERIES
DISTRICT
FISHERIES OFFICER
USER GROUPS } Roles presentlyundefined
Fi: re 14: The current situation in Uanda with respect to the discos ition of power between government and
community (OdongkaralAtailKyangwa/GongalNyapendi)
The criteria used to define the current situation in the riparian states should be specified, and the
effectiveness of each group should be assessed.
In the case of Uganda, there are three models that apply. Most beaches lie within the consultative segment.
Although the government plays a dominant role, user groups are greatly involved in management (beach
committees and task forces). Beaches may also fall in to the instructive segment where user group powers
are minimal and the government dominates. The third model in Uganda is the 'paradise' phase (not
identified on the model), where neither government nor user groups dominate and where the use of illegal
gear prevails.
Ideally, a co-operative model would be desirable for Uganda, in which user groups and the government
share equal power. In this scenario the government would have the following roles: provision of technical
backup, such as trained fisheries staff; provision of resources for implementation; and receipt of revenues.
User groups would have the following roles: a stake in the fisheries; exploiting the resources; being aware
and knowledgeable about one another. This might be achieved by: creating awareness in the fishing
communities; training of fishers; and legislation spelling out the roles of the, various user groups.
Synthesis
All participants collaborated to develop a co-management model based on the findings of the workshop
(Figure 15 and Table 1).
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Figure 15: The SEDA WOG Co-management plan
USER GROUPS
FISHING
COMMUNITIES
o fishers
o traders
O processors
e cooperatives
o LEUs (TZ)
o Task Forces
(UG)
NON-FISHING
COMMUNITIES
e 'Sungusungu'
o Vicilantes
NGOs
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DONORS
ROLES
Table I: Institutional responsibilities and stakeholder groups
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Activity Government r1GOs Pisiìin cortiniunities cuflshiri,
communities
1. Formation of To make essential Awareness of To make by-laws
regulations laws regulations
2. Monitoring Government (FD) in Task forces (UG) 'Sungusungu' (TZ)
(a) Checking,
reporting and
punishing
offenders.
(b) Patrolling
Uganda.
FD (TZ)
Beach committee
(KEN)
Vigilantes (KEN)
Vigilantes (KEN)
Fish scouts (KEN) LEUs (TZ)
Police, FD and
Marine Unit (UG).
Beach Committees
and LEUs (UG).
3. Sanctions FD Beach committees 'Sungusungu'
Task forces (UG)
4. Training FD, Research
institutes
Locally-based NGOs
5. Funds Levy trust Co-operatives
Funds to be jointly
held by the
government and the
community (to be
discussed during
national workshops).
Processing factories
6. Data collection Research institutes Beach committees
Cooperatives
Processing factories
Task forces
LEUs
7. Dissemination Extension Units NGOs
